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Abstract 
 
The current medical device regulatory system contains a dangerous loophole.  While the 
voluntary recall of a harmful medical device removes it from the market, new devices that claim 
they are substantially equivalent to the recalled device can still reach the market through the 
510(k) premarket notification process.  Devices that have gained regulatory clearance in this 
fashion have caused considerable harm and are much more likely to be recalled for safety 
reasons as well.  The recently proposed Safety of Untested and New Devices Act of 2012 (the 
“SOUND Devices Act”) would fix this loophole.  This paper describes the 510(k) clearance 
process and the recalled predicate loophole, summarizes the SOUND Devices Act’s proposed 
solution, and argues that Congress ought to enact the SOUND Devices Act.1 
I.  Introduction 
On January 31, 2012, U.S. Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) introduced a bill 
proposing the enactment of the Safety of Untested and New Devices Act of 2012 (the “SOUND 
Devices Act”).
1  The proposed legislation would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act to prevent the marketing of medical devices on the basis of substantial equivalence to 
predicate devices that have been recalled, corrected, or otherwise removed from the market for 
safety purposes.
2  Congressman Markey and his four co-sponsors claim that the SOUND Devices 
Act will plug a dangerous loophole in the 510(k) premarket notification process for medical 
devices to enter the market.
3 
As the 510(k) clearance process has become the most common regulatory pathway to 
market for medical devices,
4 any new legislation affecting this process can have profound 
consequences for both the manufacturers who market new medical devices and the consumers 
who ultimately use them.  This paper describes the SOUND Devices Act and argues that 
Congress ought to pass it.  Faulty medical device products cleared on the basis of flawed 
                                                 
1 See H.R. 3847, 112th Cong. (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 See Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey, DEFECTIVE DEVICES, DESTROYED LIVES: 
LOOPHOLE LEAVES PATIENTS UNPROTECTED FROM FLAWED MEDICAL DEVICES 3 (March 22, 
2012) [hereinafter Markey Report]. 
4 COMMITTEE ON THE PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS, 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTHY: THE FDA 510(K) 
CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 85 (2011) [hereinafter IOM 510(k) Report]. 2 
predicates have caused substantial harm to consumers in a number of cases, but the FDA 
currently lacks authority to address this problem, whether directly or using its other regulatory 
tools.  Furthermore, failing to close this loophole would undermine the policies underlying the 
510(k) clearance process and render medical device regulatory review less effective as a whole.  
Part II of this paper summarizes the framework of modern medical device regulation and the 
510(k) clearance process.  Part III describes the loophole that allows new medical devices to be 
cleared on the basis of predicates that have proved to be unsafe.  Part IV details the SOUND 
Devices Act’s proposed solution to close this loophole.  And Part V analyzes the solution, 
concluding that Congress ought to act swiftly to enact the SOUND Devices Act. 
II.  Medical Devices and the 510(k) Clearance Process 
Although medical devices have existed since ancient times and have been misbranded 
since at least the mid-1700’s, the U.S. public and legislature largely ignored the regulation of 
medical devices before the New Deal era, focusing instead on regulating food, drugs, and 
cosmetics.
5  Medical devices came within the FDA’s jurisdiction for the first time in 1938, when 
the newly passed Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FD&C Act”) included medical 
devices in its basic misbranding and adulteration provisions.
6  But these provisions only granted 
the FDA authority to regulate devices after they were placed on the market.
7  The FD&C Act 
                                                 
5 See Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding 
of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99, 99–100 (1989). 
6 Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill, and Lewis A. Grossman, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (3RD ED.) 968–69 (Foundation Press 2007). 
7 Rodney R. Munsey, Trends and Events in FDA Regulation of Medical Devices Over the Last 3 
created a system of premarket notification for new drugs, which became a premarket approval 
requirement after the Drug Amendments of 1962,
8 but no comparable premarket regulatory 
scheme existed for medical devices until Congress established the modern medical device 
regulatory framework by passing the Medical Devices Amendments (the “MDA”) in 1976. 
The MDA established the 510(k) clearance process as a by-product of the three-tiered 
medical device regulatory framework it created to balance competing considerations of ensuring 
product safety and fostering further innovation.  This regulatory framework grew out of a Study 
Group formed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare at the behest of President 
Nixon and commonly referred to as the “Cooper Committee” after Dr. Theodore Cooper, the 
group’s chairman.
9  The Cooper Committee envisioned the purpose of medical device legislation 
as not only avoiding hazards from unsafe medical devices but also promoting innovation in the 
development of new devices.
10  Responding to the Committee’s call for regulatory requirements 
calibrated to the risks presented by different devices,
11 the MDA established a three-tiered 
                                                                                                                                                           
Fifty Years, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 163 (1995). 
8 See Hutt, et al., supra note 6 at 577. 
9 Benjamin A. Goldberger, The Evolution of Substantial Equivalence in FDA’s Premarket 
Review of Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 317, 320 (2001); Robert B. Leflar, Public 
Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (1989) (“The 
concepts embodied in the Cooper Committee Report ultimately formed much of the basis for the 
1976 Medical Device Amendments.”); Hutt, supra note 5 at 112 (“The final provisions of the 
1976 Amendments are remarkably faithful to the Cooper Committee Report.”). 
10 Theodore Cooper, Device Legislation, 26 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 165, 172 (1971). 
11 Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. 4 
classification system for medical device regulation, distinct from the single pathway of 
premarket approval for all new drugs.
12  After 1976, medical devices were organized according 
to three Classes.  Class I comprises of those devices for which general controls such as 
misbranding and adulteration prohibitions and GMP regulations suffice to reasonably assure 
safety and effectiveness.  Class II devices require both general controls and product performance 
standards to reasonably assure the same.  Meanwhile, only a premarket approval (“PMA”) 
process similar to new drug approval can ensure the safety and effectiveness of Class III 
devices.
13 
Section 510(k) was created as part of the MDA’s attempt to address medical devices that 
were on the market prior to its enactment and new medical devices introduced later consistently 
within this framework.  After observing the FDA’s difficulties implementing the Drug 
Amendments for pre-1962 drugs, Congress devised a scheme to phase the new requirements in.
14  
The MDA directed the FDA to designate an appropriate Class to all pre-1976 medical devices 
according to the recommendations of independent advisory panels.  By virtue of their 
classification, pre-1976 devices placed in Classes I or II were not subject to premarket approval, 
                                                                                                                                                           
L. REV. 1753, 1807 (1996) (citing STUDY GROUP ON MEDICAL DEVICES, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MEDICAL DEVICES: A LEGISLATIVE PLAN 11 (1970)). 
12 See id. at 1807. 
13 Munsey, supra note 7 at 165–66. 
14 See Merrill, supra note 11 at 1810 (“FDA's difficulties in applying the effectiveness 
requirement to pre-1962 drugs led Congress to embrace the principle that new devices should not 
be disadvantaged by the inevitably gradual implementation of the law.”). 5 
and in the interest of avoiding market disruption for existing Class III devices,
15 pre-1976 
products designated as Class III were also not subject to premarket approval unless and until the 
FDA issued an order requesting the submission of a PMA.  Meanwhile, every new medical 
device introduced post-1976 is placed in Class III and subject to full premarket approval 
regulation, unless it is reclassified into Class I or II or, significantly, it is demonstrated to be 
“substantially equivalent” to a pre-1976 device that is not subject to premarket approval, referred 
to as a predicate.
16  The clearance of devices that are substantially equivalent to devices already 
on the market was introduced to prevent the unfairness that can result from allowing pre-1976 
devices to remain on the market while subjecting their substantially equivalent counterparts to 
the full force of post-MDA regulation before they can be marketed.
17  As a practical matter the 
FDA has also allowed using as a predicate a device that was itself cleared through 510(k) by 
                                                 
15 See Leflar, supra note 9 at 8 (noting that the different treatment of pre-1976 and post-1976 
Class III devices “was probably designed to avoid market disruptions by freeing those with an 
existing stake in the lightly regulated preenactment status quo from the application of various 
new regulatory strictures for a temporary grace period.”). 
16 Munsey, supra note 7 at 165–66; see also IOM 510(k) report, supra note 4, at 32 (“[I]f a new 
device were ‘substantially equivalent’ to a preamendment device, it could enter the market on the 
same terms and conditions as the preamendment device.”).  Under the regulatory structure 
established in 1976, a valid predicate can be any pre-1976 Class I or Class II device, or it can be 
any pre-1976 Class III device for which the FDA has not yet imposed a PMA requirement.  Hutt, 
et al., supra note 6 at 991.  Note that the current structure extends this to any legally marketed 
device.  See infra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
17 Goldberger, supra note 9 at 321. 6 
comparison to another predicate device.
18  This practice of “piggybacking” was specifically 
authorized in 1990, when Congress effectively extended the set of allowed predicates beyond 
pre-1976 devices to include any “legally marketed device.”
19  Thus, under current medical 
device regulation, a new device can be cleared for the market if it is shown to be substantially 
equivalent to a legally marketed predicate device. 
The MDA added section 510(k) to the FD&C Act to establish a premarket notification 
system for new devices to ensure that a new device cannot be marketed unless it has an approved 
PMA, it has been reclassified into Class I or II, or it is substantially equivalent to a predicate 
device.
20  Section 510(k) itself simply requires device manufacturers to notify FDA 90 days in 
advance of marketing any new device, but FDA has exercised its rule-making authority to 
require that manufacturers claiming substantial equivalence to a predicate device include in their 
premarket notifications data demonstrating the basis for substantial equivalence.
21  Since section 
510(k) effectively acts as the gatekeeper between devices touted as substantially equivalent to 
predicate devices and the market, the substantial equivalence path to FDA clearance has become 
known as the 510(k) clearance process.  Importantly, a determination that a device is 
                                                 
18 Hutt, et al., supra note 6 at 998–99. 
19 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii); see also 21 C.F.R. 807.92(a)(3) (1994) (“A legally marketed 
device to which a new device may be compared for a determination regarding substantial 
equivalence is a device that was legally marketed [pre-1976], or a device which has been 
reclassified from Class III to Class II or I . . . or a device which has been found to be 
substantially equivalent through the 510(k) premarket notification process.”) (emphasis added). 
20 H.R. REP. 94-853 at 37 (1976); Goldberger, supra note 9 at 321; Merrill, supra note 11 at 1810. 
21 Leflar, supra note 9 at 29. 7 
substantially equivalent to a predicate device does not connote FDA approval of the device’s 
safety and effectiveness.
22  However, for all intents and purposes, 510(k) clearance continues to 
act as an FDA-condoned “green light”
23 for marketing a new device that applies for a small 
number of Class I devices, most Class II devices, and some Class III devices.
24 
  The 510(k) process has come to dominate the path to market for new medical devices.  
Largely due to resource constraints at the FDA, the agency and industry alike have favored 
510(k) as the primary way to bring devices to market.
25  The relative ease of clearing 510(k) 
                                                 
22 21 C.F.R. § 807.97 (revised April 1, 2011) (noting that clearance of a device through the 
510(k) premarket notification process “does not in any way denote official approval of the 
device.”); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493 (1996) (“[T]he 510(k) process is 
focused on equivalence, not safety.”). 
23 Leflar, supra note 9 at 28. 
24 Since 1976, Congress has exempted most Class I devices from the 510(k) premarket 
notification requirement and authorized FDA to exempt Class II devices where appropriate. Hutt, 
et al., supra note 6 at 992.  Furthermore, the FDA has still not issued orders requiring PMA’s for 
all pre-1976 Class III devices.  See IOM 510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 33.  See also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-
RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW 
PROCESS, Report 09-190 to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Sen. Charles E. 
Grassley, and Rep. John D. Dingell, 17 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter GAO Devices Report] (showing 
that 1,265 Class I, 10,670 Class II, and 228 Class III devices were cleared through 510(k) during 
2003–2007). 
25 See Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction 8 
premarket notifications as compared to reviewing PMA applications or reclassifying devices to 
Class I or II has applied internal pressure on the agency to find much more often than not that 
new devices are substantially equivalent to predicate devices.
26  As a result, only 1–4% of 510(k) 
submissions each year between 1976 and 2009 were found to be not substantially equivalent.
27  
Apart from a higher probability of success, other considerations have also caused manufacturers 
to prefer 510(k) clearance.  FDA condoned and in 1990 specifically authorized the practice of 
allowing new devices to “piggyback” by demonstrating substantial equivalence to a predicate 
that also entered the market on a showing of substantial equivalence.
28  Furthermore, resource 
pressures delayed FDA’s plans to issue orders for PMA’s for pre-1976 Class III devices and 
establish performance standards for Class II devices.
29  Between 1976 and 1990, more than 98 
percent of FDA-regulated medical devices were cleared through 510(k) premarket notification, 
and in the year 2005, almost 99 percent of devices were cleared through the 510(k) process.
30  
Whether by design or not, 510(k) clearance is now the default path to market for almost all new 
medical devices. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 516 (1988). 
26 IOM 510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 33. 
27 Id. at 33. 
28 See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
29 IOM 510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 33.  As of April 2011, efforts to promulgate regulations 
requiring submission of PMA applications for Class III devices were still not finished.  IOM 
510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 34. 
30 James M. Flaherty, Jr., Defending Substantial Equivalence: An Argument for the Continuing 
Validity of the 510(k) Premarket Notification Process, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 902 (2008). 9 
III.  The Recalled predicate loophole 
1.  The current 510(k) process clears new devices that are substantially 
equivalent to recalled predicate devices. 
As the law currently stands, the FDA must allow any medical device that demonstrates 
substantial equivalence to a predicate device to reach the market, even if the predicate device 
was voluntarily recalled for safety reasons and the new device repeats the same flaws. This 
unfortunate loophole in the medical device regulatory framework arises from a conflict between 
the standards for 510(k) clearance and the FDA’s institutional role as the guarantor of the safety 
and effectiveness of medical devices. 
As mentioned above,
31 510(k) clearance has become the most common way for medical 
devices to reach patients, but the 510(k) clearance process is considered an evaluation only of a 
device’s substantial equivalence to a predicate, not of a product’s safety and effectiveness.  
Congress added language to the FD&C Act in 1990 that ostensibly enabled some level of safety 
and effectiveness review to enter the substantial equivalence inquiry.
32  The statute currently 
requires that, where a new device has “different technological characteristics” from the predicate 
with which it claims substantial equivalence, it must demonstrate that the new device is “as safe 
and effective” as the predicate and “does not raise different questions of safety and efficacy.”
33  
However, the statutory scope of such an evaluation is very narrow,
34 and it does not address the 
                                                 
31 See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text. 
32 See IOM 510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 253–54. 
33 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(2) (2006). 
34 IOM 510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 254 (“Arguably, [introducing the requirements for devices 
that had different technological characteristics] from their predicates represented an effort by 10 
underlying problem of clearing a new device based on a flawed predicate because the 
“technological characteristics” can include design flaws.
35  A device that recreates the design 
flaws of a predicate can thus reach the market, regardless of how unsafe those flaws might be.  
This also creates a perverse situation where a new device that inherits a design flaw from its 
predicate can avoid safety and effectiveness evaluation while one that changes the device to fix 
that flaw may have introduced “different technological characteristics” and undergo a more 
extensive premarket notification process.  Furthermore, according to both the FDA and 
Congress, a finding of substantial equivalence in no way indicates that a device has passed any 
sort of safety and effectiveness review.
36  The FDA has gone so far as to issue a regulation 
stating that “[a]ny representation that creates an impression of official approval of a device 
because of complying with the [510(k)] premarket notification regulations is misleading and 
constitutes misbranding.”
37  And the Congressional Research Service has found that, even if the 
FDA wanted to include safety in its 510(k) clearance evaluations, the FD&C Act would prohibit 
                                                                                                                                                           
Congress and the FDA to redesign the 510(k) system to include an evaluation of safety and 
effectiveness of all new devices.  Nevertheless, the statutory scope of such an evaluation was 
very limited.”). 
35 Markey Report, supra note 3 at 5 (citing Communications between FDA staff and 
Representative Markey staff, March 7, 2012). 
36 See H.R. REP. No. 101-808 at 27 (1990) (“A determination by the FDA that a device is 
substantially equivalent to another device is a final agency action under the substantial 
equivalent provisions, but it does not preclude further agency action regarding safety and 
effectiveness.”). 
37 21 C.F.R. § 807.97 (revised April 1, 2011). 11 
it from doing so.
38  In effect, when a device demonstrates it is substantially equivalent to a 
predicate device, “FDA cannot deny clearance based on an independent determination of the 
safety and effectiveness of the device under review.”
39 
As a backstop, the FD&C Act prohibits using as a predicate any device that has been the 
subject of a mandatory removal order,
40 but the vast majority of recalls are voluntary.  Section 
518(e), added in 1990,
41 directs the FDA to order manufacturers, importers, distributors, and 
retailers to cease the manufacture and distribution of a device if it finds there is a “reasonable 
probability that [it] would cause serious, adverse health consequences or death.”
42  Following 
such an order, the FDA must provide the affected parties an opportunity for an informal hearing 
on the merits of the order and the need for a recall, after which the FDA may amend its order to 
require a recall from everyone except individuals and certain device user facilities within its 
discretion.
43  However, the FDA very rarely exercises its mandatory recall authority because 
most manufacturers, upon discovering that a device presents a serious risk, agree to a voluntary 
recall.  A recent Government Accountability Office report on medical device recalls counted 
                                                 
38 Memorandum from Vanessa Burrows, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service, 
to Rep. Edward Markey, The FDA’s Authority with Regard to Substantial Equivalence 
Determinations (March 16, 2012) [hereinafter CRS Memorandum on Substantial Equivalence]. 
39 Markey Report, supra note 3 at 5 (citing Communications between FDA staff and 
Representative Markey staff, March 7, 2012). 
40 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(2) (2006). 
41 IOM 510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 57; Hutt, supra note 6 at 1059. 
42 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e)(1) (2006). 
43 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e)(2) (2006). 12 
3,510 voluntary recalls between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2009 but noted that during 
that period the FDA did not issue a single mandatory recall order.
44  The invocation of the recall 
order is rare enough that the FDA does not formally track such orders and can only estimate that 
it has used its authority to force device recalls at least three times in the last two decades.
45  
Under current law, all of the 3,510 devices recalled from 2005 through 2009 can act as valid 
predicates for new devices, even if those devices repeat the flaws that led to the recalls in the 
first place. 
2.  Harmful products have reached the market through the recalled predicate 
loophole. 
Out of all the predicates cited by the 510(k) submissions received by the FDA in 2009, 29 
percent were devices that were not registered and listed in either 2009 or 2010, suggesting that 
these were predicates that had been removed from the market.
46  According to the FDA, each 
year the agency clears an average of 28 devices that demonstrate substantial equivalence to a 
predicate known to be recalled, and such devices are five times more likely to be recalled with a 
                                                 
44 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD ENHANCE ITS 
OVERSIGHT OF RECALLS, Report 11-468 to Sen. Charles E. Grassley and Sen. Herb Kohl, 3, n.5, 
14 (June 2011). 
45 IOM 510(k) Report, supra note 4 at 57 (citing Desjardins, P.R., FDA response to information 
inquiry from the IOM Committee on the Public Health Effectiveness of the 510(k) Clearance 
Process (Jan. 7, 2011)). 
46 CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) 
WORKING GROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 57 (August 2010) [hereinafter 
CDRH Preliminary Report]. 13 
design flaw than other devices.
47  The following two examples highlight the harm that these 
devices can produce and the danger caused by the regulatory loophole that allows them to reach 
patients. 
Transvaginal mesh implants—hammock-shaped slings inserted to treat urinary 
incontinence and to repair pelvic organ prolapse—have contributed to severe injuries and even 
death long after the recall of early versions of the device, rendering it a potent example of the 
recalled predicate loophole.  In 1997, the FDA cleared the ProteGen sling, manufactured by 
Boston Scientific Corporation, for marketing based on a showing that it was substantially 
equivalent to mesh devices already on the market.
48  The product was a colossal failure from a 
safety standpoint, as it proved to erode extremely quickly within 8 months of implantation, 
causing bleeding ulcers and infections, and Boston Scientific voluntarily recalled the ProteGen 
sling in January 1999.
49  Unfortunately, the withdrawal of this product did not deter 
manufacturers from referring to it as a predicate device in subsequent 510(k) premarket 
                                                 
47 See DELOITTE CENTER FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, HEALTH CARE REFORM MEMO: MARCH 26, 
2012, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Insights/Browse-by-Content-
Type/Newsletters/health-care-reform-
memo/efdeadabede46310VgnVCM3000001c56f00aRCRD.htm (citing Brett Norman, Today in 
Politico Pro, March 23, 2012, 
http://dyn.politico.com/members/forums/thread.cfm?catid=16&subcatid=57&threadid=6550012 
(quoting FDA spokesperson Karen Riley)). 
48 L. Lewis Wall, The Perils of Commercially Driven Surgical Innovation, AM. J. OBSTET. 
GYNECOL., 202:30.e1–4, 30.e2 (2010); Markey Report, supra note 3 at 8. 
49 Wall, supra note 48 at 30.e2. 14 
notification clearances.  Most notably, Mentor Corporation introduced a vaginal mesh product 
called ObTape in 2003, and it cleared the FDA 510(k) process on the basis of substantial 
equivalence to two products, one of which had as its 510(k) predicate the ProteGen sling.
50  Soon 
after ObTape’s introduction, however, concerns about its safety arose.  Literature studying 
ObTape-related complications has reported erosion of the mesh, abscess formation, erosion of 
vaginal tissue, and infection after ObTape insertion,
51 resulting in 266 reports of adverse events 
to the FDA as of 2009.
52  The device was removed from the market in March 2006,
53 and its 
legacy contributed to the FDA’s release of a public safety warning to health care providers and 
patients about the risks of transvaginal mesh devices.
54  However, under the current regulatory 
                                                 
50 Roni Caryn Rabin, Women Sue Over Device to Stop Urine Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at 
D5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/health/05tape.html (last visited April 7, 
2012). 
51 See Roxana Geoffrion, et al., Closing the Chapter on Obtape: A Case Report of Delayed Thigh 
Abscess and a Literature Review, J. OBSTET. GYNAECOL. CAN., 30(2): 143–147 (Feb. 2008). 
52 Rabin, supra note 50.  Ten deaths have also occurred in patients who have undergone 
transvaginal mesh procedures, five of which were linked to the mesh insertion procedure, one 
linked to complications from mesh removal, and four linked to post-operative complications not 
related to the mesh.  OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY DEVICES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMIN., SURGICAL MESH FOR TREATMENT OF WOMEN WITH PELVIC ORGAN PROLAPSE 
AND STRESS URINARY INCONTINENCE 14, 29 (Sept. 8–9, 2011). 
53 Geoffrion, et al., supra note 51 at 146. 
54 FDA Safety Communication: UPDATE on Serious Complications Associated with 
Transvaginal Placement of Surgical Mesh for Pelvic Organ Prolapse (July 13, 2011), 15 
regime, not only did nothing keep ObTape from reaching the market based on a predicate lineage 
that included previously recalled products, but manufacturers can continue basing future 510(k) 
submissions on substantial equivalence to ObTape and market new devices with the same design 
flaws. 
Another type of medical device produced by Boston Scientific, the Resolution and 
Resolution II endoscopic clips, provides a stark example of a manufacturer’s ability to market a 
flawed device, recall it when problems arise, and then quickly gain clearance for a follow-on 
device that repeats the flaws of its own recently recalled device.  Endoscopic clips are metallic 
clips used for closing surfaces inside the body to stop gastrointestinal bleeding, close 
perforations, secure catheters or stents, and serve as markers for other therapies.
55  Boston 
Scientific recalled its Resolution clip in June 2009 in part because the clip sometimes would not 
deploy and, when it did deploy, sometimes would not release from tissue properly.
56  This 
created a risk that attempting to withdraw the delivery system would cause harm to the tissue that 
the clip had attached to.
57  Despite these problems with the Resolution clip, Boston Scientific 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/safety/alertsandnotices/ucm262435.htm (last visited April 7, 
2012) [hereinafter FDA Updated Transvaginal Mesh Warning]. 
55 See AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR GASTROINTESTINAL ENDOSCOPY, TECHNOLOGY STATUS 
EVALUATION REPORT, ENDOSCOPIC CLIP APPLICATION DEVICES, GASTROINTESTINAL 
ENDOSCOPY, VOL. 63, NO. 6, 746–750, 746 (2006). 
56 FDA Enforcement Report for October 7, 2009, 
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm185718.htm (last visited April 7, 
2012). 
57 See Markey Report, supra note 3 at 11. 16 
received FDA clearance to market a second clip—called the Resolution II—based on a 
determination that it was substantially equivalent to the Resolution clip in December 2010, only 
a year and a half after Boston Scientific started gathering the first clip back from distributors.
58  
While it cleared the device on substantial equivalence grounds, the FDA sought to address its 
lingering safety concerns by requesting stronger warnings in the Resolution II’s label.
59  
Regrettably, those concerns were prescient, as the Resolution II was also removed from the 
market in short order in August 2011, citing problems very similar to those responsible for the 
recall of the Resolution clip.
60  The Resolution II’s delivery system sometimes failed to withdraw 
once the clip had deployed, creating the same risk that withdrawing the delivery system would 
damage tissue.
61  Under the current legal regime, Boston Scientific could produce a substantially 
equivalent “Resolution III” clip with the same flaws and the FDA would have to grant 510(k) 
clearance.  This loophole effectively allows device manufacturers to test new iterations of flawed 
devices not in a controlled clinical environment but on the unsuspecting public by releasing each 
new version to the market through the 510(k) process, voluntarily recalling the product if it 
proves harmful, and releasing the next version a short time thereafter under the rubric of 510(k) 
                                                 
58 See Letter from FDA to Elena Nieves, Sr. Regulatory Affairs Specialist, Boston Scientific 
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substantial equivalence, without having spent the time to do substantial further testing.
62 
IV.  The SOUND Devices Act’s Proposed Solution 
The SOUND Devices Act consists of four legislative proposals aimed at not only closing 
this loophole in the medical device regulatory framework but also establishing a robust system 
for manufacturers, the FDA, and the public to share information regarding the safety records of 
predicate devices.  Specifically, the bill proposes (1) giving the FDA the authority to reject a 
device based on a recalled predicate; (2) requiring companies to submit information to the FDA 
about the market status of predicate devices; (3) instructing the FDA to create a public database 
of devices’ eligibility to act as predicates; and (4) authorizing the FDA to review the effect that 
new device recalls have on devices in the same predicate lineage.
63 
The most direct way in which the SOUND Devices Act would plug the recalled predicate 
loophole is by amending the FD&C Act to bolster the FDA’s authority to reject claims of 
substantial equivalence to predicate devices that have proven to have serious safety issues.  The 
bill would preserve and repeat the current prohibition against basing a substantial equivalence 
determination on a predicate that has been subject to a mandatory recall or has been determined 
to be misbranded or adulterated by judicial order.
64  But it would also add language to section 
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513(i) of the FD&C Act that gives the FDA authority to reject a claim that a new device is 
substantially equivalent to a predicate if the predicate or any other device in the predicate lineage 
was removed from the market and the removal was “due, in whole or in part, to an intrinsic flaw 
in technology or design that adversely affects safety” (which includes voluntary recalls).
65  This 
provision seeks to plug the recalled predicate loophole by granting the FDA discretionary 
authority to reject devices based on voluntarily recalled predicates, but it does not require the 
FDA to do so.  The aim of this approach is to maintain the FDA’s flexibility in its 
implementation of this authority,
66 allowing it to introduce the requirement without overly 
disrupting the device industry. 
In order to facilitate the FDA’s evaluation of the safety records of predicate devices, the 
bill’s second proposal would require a manufacturer seeking 510(k) clearance for a new device 
to furnish information about the market status of devices in its predicate lineage and the 
connections between any flaws in the predicates and the safety of the new device.  In particular, 
the proposed provision would require the manufacturer to disclose, for each predicate device: (1) 
whether it has been corrected or removed from the market, (2) the basis for any correction or 
removal, including whether it was due to an “intrinsic flaw” that “adversely affects safety,” and 
(3) why the new device does not share such a flaw.
67  This provision would require 
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66 Markey Report, supra note 3 at 7. 
67 H.R. 3847, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2012). 19 
manufacturers to contemplate the safety of the predicate devices on which they base new 
products and force them to include information about those safety records in their 510(k) 
submissions, which they do not currently have to do.
 68  In conjunction with the authority that the 
bill would grant the FDA to reject new devices that are based on harmful predicates, such a 
requirement would prevent situations like that of Oscor Inc.’s Adelante catheter introducer 
device.  When the Adelante device was introduced to the market in 2007 on the basis of 
substantial equivalence to two earlier catheter products, Oscor failed to mention in its 510(k) 
submission that those products had been recalled in 2004 and 2005.
69  Then in 2008, Oscor 
recalled the Adelante device after discovering that it caused safety problems similar to those that 
led to the recall of its predicate devices.
70  Under the SOUND Devices Act, Oscor would have 
had to divulge the market status of the predicate devices to the FDA, which could have then 
exercised its authority to keep the device off the market because its predicates had been subject 
to recalls. 
The third proposal the SOUND Devices Act makes is to instruct the FDA to create and 
maintain an up-to-date database that provides a common pool of information for the FDA, the 
public, and industry about medical devices’ market status and eligibility as predicates.  The 
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proposed legislation would require the FDA to update this database when it makes a 
determination regarding the eligibility of a device to act as a predicate, and it would require the 
FDA to make such a determination when the agency issues a recall order for a device, the 
manufacturer reports a device recall, or the FDA “otherwise learns of a correction or removal of 
a device.”
 71 The database would ultimately include records of all device recalls and their effects 
on predicate eligibility, since the FD&C Act as it currently stands requires device manufacturers 
to report voluntary recalls to the FDA.
72  Furthermore, the database would also include details 
regarding the causes for those recalls, because the SOUND Devices Act would instruct the FDA 
to include in the database “information . . . about the reason for the [recall]” and institute 
heightened reporting requirements that obligate manufacturers to submit addenda accompanying 
their voluntary recall reports that describe “the root cause assessment of each device defect 
leading to the [recall].”
73  In addition to providing the public with reliable information about 
device recalls, the purpose of this database would be to create a central resource on predicate 
eligibility so manufacturers can meet their obligations to avoid recalled predicates and furnish 
the FDA with market status information for the predicate lineages of their new products.
74 
Finally, when new devices are recalled, the SOUND Devices Act would authorize the 
FDA to proactively review the effect that those recalls have on other devices in their lineages.  
The bill accomplishes this by allowing the FDA to order the manufacturers of devices in the 
same lineage as a newly recalled device to submit a report within 30 days stating whether their 
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devices share any intrinsic flaws with the recalled device and, if not, explain why.
75  This 
provision makes sure that the FDA can head off any flaws in recalled devices that are repeated in 
their substantially equivalent progeny, even if they have already been marketed.
76  For example, 
if Device A is a predicate device for both Device B, which is already on the market, and Device 
C, a new device in development, a recall of Device A should not trigger scrutiny of Device C’s 
510(k) clearance while ignoring the implications for Device B’s safety.  This rule allows the 
FDA to scrutinize both devices in light of the recall of a common predicate. 
V. Analysis 
Significant opposition has gathered in the medical device industry against the proposals 
embodied by the SOUND Devices Act and similar regulatory recommendations made by a 
working group at the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (“CDRH”).
77  This Part 
will respond to opponents’ arguments and demonstrate that Congress ought to pass the SOUND 
Devices Act because (1) the bill would enable the 510(k) clearance process to better address 
issues of device safety, (2) failing to adopts its proposals would undermine the noninferiority 
policy underlying the 510(k) clearance process, and (3) without legislative reform the FDA 
currently lacks the authority and tools to deal with the recalled predicate loophole. 
                                                 
75 H.R. 3847, 112th Cong., § 2(d)(2) (2012). 
76 Id. 
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1.  If the SOUND Devices Act were enacted, the 510(k) clearance process would 
better address the safety of medical devices.  
The SOUND Devices Act would improve the ability of the 510(k) clearance process to 
address the safety of new medical devices.  Industry voices have argued that increasing the 
FDA’s scrutiny of devices’ eligibility to act as predicates will hinder innovation by increasing 
costs and delays in the marketing of new devices.  Comments from industry representatives 
predicted that disallowing the use of certain devices would shrink the pool of available 
predicates, leading to a more difficult pathway for devices and increasing the time and cost 
associated with 510(k) clearance.
78  However, while the increased regulatory requirements 
authorized by the SOUND Devices Act may make the 510(k) clearance process more difficult 
and more costly, the extent of this effect is consistent with and justified by the safety interest that 
underlies FDA oversight of medical devices. 
The proposed legislation would limit the pool of available predicates and thereby create a 
greater barrier for some new devices, but it would only eliminate predicates of limited value and 
allow the FDA to reject devices that are more likely to be harmful than others.  As some industry 
members have conceded, banning certain substandard devices from predicate eligibility may 
improve the safety and effectiveness of new devices.
79  The benefit to public safety of 
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determining that a device is ineligible to act as a predicate is nowhere clearer than where a 
device was voluntarily recalled and thereby deemed “substandard” by its manufacturer.  Out of 
over 2,400 medical devices that the FDA clears through the 510(k) process each year,
80 an 
average of only 28 list recalled devices as predicates in their submissions.
81  Granting the FDA 
the authority to reject devices that claim substantial equivalence to recalled predicates would 
thus affect barely more than one percent of submissions each year.  Meanwhile, these 28 devices 
are five times more likely to be recalled like their predicates were,
82 potentially causing severe 
harm and widespread health complications for patients in the meantime.  The added benefit to 
public health and safety of removing devices predicated on recalled products is thus 
disproportionate to the cost to the industry in terms of the number of devices that are affected, 
and prohibiting recalled devices from acting as predicates would likely improve the safety of 
new devices. 
In addition to this specific cost-benefit analysis, the SOUND Devices Act would bring 
the 510(k) clearance pathway closer in line with the overarching goal of medical device 
regulation to ensure the safety and effectiveness of products for the consumer.  Many courts and 
commentators have viewed 510(k) premarket notification negatively, largely due to a belief that 
the 510(k) process provides little in the way of assuring that devices utilizing this path to market 
are safe and effective.
83  In a recent report, the Institute of Medicine criticized the 510(k) process 
as “neither making safe and effective devices available to patients nor promoting innovation in 
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the medical-device industry” and suggested that the FDA abandon it in favor of a new pathway 
that is more closely tied to independent judgments of safety and effectiveness.
84  Commentators 
have complained that the 510(k) process encourages manufacturers to look to recasting past 
devices rather than truly innovating,
85 that this leads to inefficient resource allocation with 
respect to both product development and testing products for safety and effectiveness,
86 and that 
substantial equivalence determinations therefore provide little protection to the public.
87  
Contrary to Congress’s intentions in drafting the MDA in 1976, the 510(k) exception has 
swallowed the rule of premarket approval of device safety and effectiveness,
88 causing medical 
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device regulation to drift away from the central paradigm of food and drug regulation.  While the 
SOUND Devices Act will not cure the 510(k) pathway of all its ailments, it would insert into the 
substantial equivalence determination some independent evaluation of the safety of new devices 
by considering their predicates’ safety records.  The bill is thus a proposal to nudge the 510(k) 
process in the direction of a regime that focuses on device safety and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, while there may be legitimate concerns about the effect that higher costs 
and delays in the 510(k) clearance process may have on medical device innovation, perpetuating 
a dangerous loophole is not the appropriate way to deal with those issues.  The recent CDRH 
Medical Device Innovation Initiative proposed a number of ways to support greater innovation in 
ways that do not directly compromise public health and safety.
89  These include facilitating the 
development of pioneering technologies, strengthening the scientific and regulatory research 
infrastructure, and increasing CDRH’s preparedness to respond to transformative innovations 
and scientific breakthroughs.
90  Moreover, it is a misnomer to characterize the object of medical 
device regulation as promoting innovation through the introduction of new products per se; 
rather, its goal should be to facilitate innovation by permitting the timely entry of new devices 
that it expects will improve public health.
91  As noted by the FDA 510(k) Working Group, a 
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proper study of how the FDA facilitates innovation should go beyond measures of “time to 
market” and the number of devices on the market and focus instead on an understanding of the 
broader relationship between regulation, innovation, and public health.
92  Thus, any argument 
against the SOUND Devices Act that refers only to the phenomena of increased costs and delays 
or fewer available devices and predicates does not properly address concerns about innovation in 
the medical device industry. 
2.  Failing to close the recalled predicate loophole would undermine the 
noninferiority principle underlying the 510(k) process. 
Failing to address the recalled predicate loophole would ultimately undermine the 
noninferiority principle that underlies the use of substantial equivalence as the basis for the 
510(k) clearance of medical devices.  As discussed above, the policy that motivated the creation 
of 510(k) substantial equivalence was a desire for parity in the MDA’s treatment of pre-1976 and 
post-1976 medical devices.
93  However, a basic principle of “noninferiority” also underlies 
510(k) clearance, since the process is based on the premise that the safety and effectiveness of 
any new device cleared on the basis of substantial equivalence is at least equal to that of a legally 
marketed predicate device.
94  This principle is reflected in statutory and regulatory language that 
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requires new devices whose technological characteristics differ from their predicates to be “as 
safe and effective” as the latter.
95  In theory, noninferiority can establish a reasonable minimum 
standard for the safety of a new device by presuming that introducing a new medical device that 
is as safe and effective as a legally marketed medical device should not have an overall negative 
effect on public safety.
96  But by allowing a new device to reach the market based on substantial 
equivalence to a device that is proven to be harmful, the recalled predicate loophole flies in the 
face of this presumption and threatens the legitimacy of the 510(k) clearance process.  A 
predicate that has been recalled has proved to have a negative effect on public health and safety, 
and allowing the clearance of a device that is merely no less safe than such a predicate erodes the 
premise that substantial equivalence reasonably assures public safety will not be harmed by the 
introduction of a new medical device.  To the contrary, the current regime would hypothetically 
even allow devices that are expected to be harmful to reach the market because a device that is 
equally safe (and thus equally harmful) to a recalled predicate can be cleared under 510(k).  By 
empowering the FDA to eliminate this possibility, the SOUND Devices Act’s proposal to plug 
the recalled predicate loophole would bring the 510(k) clearance process back in line with the 
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principle that substantial equivalence determinations provide some assurance that newly cleared 
devices are not harmful to public health and safety. 
The tension between the recalled predicate loophole and the principle of noninferiority is 
further exacerbated by the phenomenon of “predicate creep” that plagues the 510(k) clearance 
process.  The SOUND Devices Act’s proposals would prevent this phenomenon from 
proliferating the harmful effects of a device recall.  Given the approved practice of 
“piggybacking” a device’s substantial equivalence on predicates that were themselves cleared 
based on substantial equivalence to a third device,
97 incremental device changes may, over a 
number of iterations, result in a device that is significantly different from the original, in a 
phenomenon referred to as “predicate creep.”
98  When each iteration of a device claims to be 
merely at least as safe and effective as its predicate, this phenomenon can lead to a “difference in 
effectiveness between [the latest and earliest iterations that] may approach clinical 
significance.”
99  Therefore, if one device in this chain of predicates proves to be harmful enough 
to merit its withdrawal from the market, it raises significant implications for the safety and 
effectiveness of other devices in the chain.  Through the mechanics of “predicate creep,” a flaw 
introduced in one predicate may propagate and even amplify in later iterations, further 
exacerbating the erosion of the principle that noninferiority reasonably assures safety and 
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effectiveness, as discussed above.  The SOUND Devices Act’s proposals would address this 
problem by providing that the recall of a predicate triggers scrutiny of not only new devices but 
also devices that are already on the market and claim substantial equivalence to that predicate.
100  
By addressing all devices in the affected predicate lineage, this proposal would mitigate the 
effects of “predicate creep” and ensure that determinations of substantial equivalence lead to the 
introduction of products that are not expected to be harmful to public health and safety. 
3.  Legislative reform is necessary to fix the recalled predicate loophole. 
The FDA currently lacks the authority to adequately address the safety and effectiveness 
of devices based on predicates that have been recalled for safety reasons, necessitating a 
statutory intervention such as the SOUND Devices Act.  Medical device industry representatives 
have argued that proposed legislation to increase FDA authority is unnecessary because “FDA 
already has abundant authority to carry out its mandate” to ensure the safety and effectiveness of 
medical devices.
101  However, the Congressional Research Service has concluded that the FD&C 
Act does not currently authorize the FDA to deny a 510(k) clearance because it is based on 
substantial equivalence to a predicate device that has been recalled voluntarily.
102  If a new 
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device has the same intended use and technological characteristics as a faulty predicate, the FDA 
has no authority to deny clearance on the basis of substantial equivalence.
103  If a new device has 
the same intended use but different technological characteristics, the FDA must clear the device 
so long as it is “as safe and effective” as the faulty device and raises no “different questions of 
safety and effectiveness,”
104 seemingly ensuring that new devices can repeat their predicates’ 
faults.  Furthermore, the current statute is very specific about the requirement that the FDA may 
only review information related to substantial equivalence, to the exclusion of independent 
questions of safety.
105  The FD&C Act instructs that the FDA “shall only request information 
that is necessary to making substantial equivalence determinations” and must do so in the “least 
burdensome” way to the manufacturer.
106 
The FDA’s continued clearance of new devices that the agency knows are based on 
flawed predicates highlights the agency’s inability to address the recalled predicate loophole 
without legislative action.  As noted above,
107 the FDA acknowledges that devices predicated on 
recalled devices are five times more likely to be recalled themselves, but it continues to clear an 
average of 28 such devices each year.  Furthermore, the agency’s current set of regulatory tools 
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is inadequate to address the safety concerns that may accompany new devices that are 
substantially equivalent to flawed predicates.  For example, the FDA has issued public health 
notifications describing “serious complications” associated with the use of transvaginal mesh 
devices,
108 but it lacks the authority to keep new transvaginal mesh devices that, like Mentor’s 
Obtape sling,
109 are substantially equivalent to previously recalled devices off the market.  As a 
result, at least 13 new transvaginal mesh devices have been introduced since the first FDA public 
health warning in October 2008,
110 despite 2,874 reports of injuries, deaths, and malfunctions 
between 2008 and 2010.
111  FDA’s power to enforce labeling requirements has also not been 
effective in preventing devices based on flawed predicates from causing harm.  As discussed 
above,
112 Boston Scientific’s Resolution II endoscopic clip reached the market based on 
substantial equivalence to the recalled Resolution clip, and to mitigate foreseeable issues with the 
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product, the FDA required a stronger warning on the device’s label.
113  However, the Resolution 
II was still ultimately recalled on the basis of a flaw it repeated from the Resolution clip.
114  If 
the SOUND Devices Act were passed, Boston Scientific would have had to submit information 
during the Resolution II’s 510(k) process that revealed the presence of the same flaw that led to 
the Resolution’s recall, and the FDA would have had the power to reject the device on that basis. 
The FDA’s want for regulatory power to remedy this type of situation has led Jeffrey Shuren, 
director of the CDRH, to express the agency’s support for a legislative fix to the loophole.
115 
It is also relevant to note that industry comments have been self-contradictory with 
respect to the need for legislation to fix the recalled predicate loophole.  Industry comments in 
opposition to the SOUND Devices Act, a piece of proposed legislation, claim that no such 
legislation is necessary.  However, industry comments in response to a recommendation by the 
FDA’s 510(k) Working Group that the CDRH consider developing regulatory guidance on when 
an unsafe device should no longer be available as a predicate noted that such a recommendation 
would require a statutory amendment to be implemented.
116  Industry opinion on the appropriate 
form of reform appears to change depending on whether the reform it opposes is in the form of a 
legislative bill or regulatory guidance.  This undermines the credibility of complaints that 
legislation is unnecessary. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
Tremendous external pressure has mounted against suggestions for medical device 
regulatory reform recently.
117  But as discussed above, the current regulatory system is not viable 
without fixing the recalled predicate loophole in the 510(k) clearance process.  The SOUND 
Devices Act would grant the FDA the authority to scrutinize both new devices and devices 
already on the market that have recalled products in their predicate lineages, and it would 
establish new reporting requirements and a public database so that the FDA, manufacturers, and 
consumers can access information regarding the market status and safety records of predicate 
devices.  Whether Congress wants to maintain the current 510(k) regime or ultimately discard it 
in favor of a better regulatory pathway,
118 enacting this reform would enable the medical device 
regulatory system to better address safety and effectiveness concerns, plug a loophole that 
undermines the principles underlying the 510(k) process, and address a problem that requires a 
legislative solution.  Congress should resist pressures from industry and other groups and pass 
the SOUND Devices Act in the interest of consumer protection. 
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